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Abstract
Identification of peer effects is complicated by the fact that the individuals under
study may self-select their peers. Random assignment to peer groups has proven
useful to sidestep such a concern. In the absence of a formal randomization mechanism
it needs to be argued that assignment is ‘as good as’ random. This paper introduces
a simple yet powerful test to do so. We provide theoretical results for this test and
explain why it dominates existing alternatives. Asymptotic power calculations and an
analysis of the assignment mechanism of players to playing partners in tournaments of
the Professional Golfer’s Association is used to illustrate these claims. Our approach
can equally be used to test for the presence of peer effects. To illustrate this we test for
the presence of peer effects in the classroom using kindergarten data collected within
Project STAR. We find no evidence of peer effects once we control for classroom fixed
effects and a set of student characteristics.
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Introduction
A fundamental issue when trying to infer peer effects is the concern that the individuals
under study, at least partially, self-select their reference group. Exploiting the random
assignment of individuals to peer groups has proven to be a fruitful way forward. Sacerdote
(2001) and Zimmerman (2003) estimate peer effects in college achievement by making
use of the (conditional) random assignment of students to roommates. Katz, Kling and
Liebman (2001) and Duflo and Saez (2003) are other early examples that use such exogenous
variation in other settings.
In many studies on peer effects there is no formal randomization mechanism. In others
the randomization is done at a higher level than under the experiment ideal. Examples
of the former situation are in the work of Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2009) and Mas
and Moretti (2009), both of which concern workers being assigned to teams or shifts.
An example of the latter is Project STAR, where students appear to have been randomly
assigned only to classes of a certain size, not to classrooms themselves; see Sojourner (2013)
for a detailed discussion on this. In such settings more work is needed to convincingly argue
that the assignment of peers is ‘as good as random’.
Sacerdote (2001) pioneered a regression-based approach to test for random assignment.
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) pointed out that this test favors alternatives where
there is negative assortative matching between peers, and suggested a modification.1 Their
proposal has been used frequently—Carrell, Fullerton and West (2009), Sojourner (2013),
and Lu and Anderson (2015) are examples—but it has not been subject to theoretical
investigation. The limited simulation evidence available suggests that it is size correct
but has low power (Stevenson, 2015). Thus, the test would have difficulty in detecting
1The intuition given in Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) and repeated elsewhere in the literature
(Caeyers and Fafchamps, 2020) is that individuals cannot be their own peers. While this argument explains
why the test favors negative alternatives it does not explain the cause of the size distortion. In fact, minor
modifications to the proof of (1.1) below show that size distortion would also be present when individuals
can be their own peers. Furthermore, in such a case the test will tend to favor alternatives where assortative
matching is positive. In all cases, the cause of the (asymptotic) size distortion is the presence of fixed effects.
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violations of the null of random assignment.
In this paper we propose an alternative adjustment to the test of Sacerdote (2001), and
study its properties under the null and under various local alternatives. The approach is
based on a bias calculation and is straightforward to implement (a Stata implementation is
also available). It allows both peer groups and urns from which peers are drawn to be of the
same or of different sizes, accommodates designs in which peer groups need not be mutually
exclusive, and is robust to heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form. Because assignment is
usually random only conditional on allocation to urns, our test, like Sacerdote’s (2001),
controls for fixed effects at the urn level. A straightforward modification to the test that
allows to control for additional covariates is also presented.
The derivations underlying our test also allow to establish formal results for the test
of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009). First, we confirm that the test is indeed size
correct. Moreover, their proposal corresponds to an alternative way of performing the bias
correction that is inherent in our procedure, when either an urn-level homoskedasticity
assumption is satisfied or peer groups are mutually exclusive. This alternative approach is
only implementable when there is variation in urn size, however. Second, we provide an
asymptotic representation that helps to explain the low power that has been observed for
the test of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009). We illustrate the power loss through
theoretical power calculations and show that the test can have trivial power against a wide
range of alternatives. In all cases considered our test is uniformly more powerful than
theirs, and considerably so.
The test developed here can equally be applied to test for the presence of peer effects
in the linear-in-means model without modification. This is a useful observation because
the test does not require the usual conditions for identification in such settings under the
alternative. Furthermore, identification is much easier to establish once such effects can be
ruled out.
We present two empirical applications of our test that illustrate its usefulness. The
first is a re-analysis of the data on professional golf tournaments of Guryan, Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2009). Here, players that enter a tournament are randomly assigned to
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playing partners, conditional on belonging to the same player category. Like theirs, our
test supports that this is indeed the case. However, unconditional on player categories,
player assignment is non-random. While our test convincingly detects this violation, the
test of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) continues to strongly support the null of
random assignment. This type-II error is a direct consequence of the test having low power.
To illustrate an alternative use of our test, our second empirical illustration tests for the
presence of peer effects in student performance. We use the data on SAT mathematics scores
of kindergarten students in 317 Tennessee classrooms collected within Project STAR. The
data from Project STAR have been analysed extensively for a variety of purposes. Graham
(2008) and Rose (2017) use the same data as do we to estimate models of peer effects.
While identification can be achieved through information contained in second moments of
test scores there is a concern that in the Project STAR data it is weak (see Rose 2017,
p. S55 for a discussion). Our approach is different. Rather than fitting an unrestricted
model we test for the presence of peer effects directly. If such effects can be ruled out,
the problem of identification simplifies considerably. In our data, there is evidence of such
effects conditional only on classroom fixed effects. However, once we additionally control
for a set of characteristics this significance vanishes. Hence, we do not find evidence of
spillover effects here.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets up the problem, derives our test
statistic, and presents its statistical properties. Section 2 connects to the alternative tests
proposed elsewhere and, notably, provides a theoretical comparison to the proposal of
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009). Section 3 contains two extensions. First, to allow
for arbitrary heteroskedasticity; these calculations also verify that our original test is fully
robust to heteroskedasticity when peer groups are mutually exclusive. Second, It also
shows how to modify the approach to accommodate additional control variables. Section 4
presents our two empirical illustrations. A short conclusion end the paper. All proofs are
collected in the Appendix.
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1 Testing random assignment
Consider a setting where we observe stratified data on r independent urns containing,
respectively, n1, . . . nr individuals. Within each urn individuals are assigned to peer groups.
The assignment of peers in urn g is recorded in the ng × ng matrix
(Ag)i,j :=
 1 if i and j are peers0 if they are not ;
as individuals cannot be their own peer matrixAg has only zeros on its main diagonal.
2 The
number of peers of individual i is mg(i) :=
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j. We assume that each individual
has at least one peer but do not otherwise restrict peer groups; they may be of different
sizes and are allowed to overlap. The goal is to test whether individuals are randomly
assigned to their respective peer groups.
Let xg,i be an observable characteristic of individual i in urn g. Sacerdote (2001) noted
that, under random assignment, xg,i will be uncorrelated with xg,j for all j ∈ [i], where
[i] := {j : (Ag)i,j = 1} is the set of i’s peers. Letting x¯g,[i] := mg(i)−1
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j xg,j, the
average value of the characteristic among i’s peers, he then proceeded by testing whether
the slope coefficient in a within-group regression of xg,i on x¯g,[i] is statistically different
from zero. The within-group estimator controls for fixed effects at the urn level. This is
important as, even if assignment is randomized within urns, individuals might be assigned
to an urn based on other attributes. In the data of Sacerdote (2001), for example, students
are randomly assigned to rooms conditionally on gender and their answers to a set of survey
questions. If peer assignment within urns is presumed to only be random conditional on a
set of additional covariates wg,i, say, they can equally be controlled for by including them
as additional regressors.
2Everything to follow can be modified to deal with situations where the adjacency matrices A1, . . . ,Ar
are asymmetric (as in directed networks), have non-binary entries (covering weighted networks), and have
a non-zero main diagonal (allowing individuals to be their own peer). To maintain focus we do not pursue
the most general case here.
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1.1 Bias calculation
As observed by Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009), the test just described will typically
not be size correct. To see the problem, and a path forward, we start by a bias calculation.
For now we ignore any additional covariates wg,i and thus consider a fixed-effect regression
of xg,i on x¯g,[i]. The within-group estimator, ρˆ, is defined as the solution to the normal
equation
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i]
(
x˜g,i − ρˆ x¯g,[i]
)
= 0,
where x˜g,i and ˜¯xg,[i] are deviations of, respectively, xg,i and x¯g,[i], from their within-urn
mean. A calculation given in the Appendix shows that the normal equation is biased.
Moreover,
E0
(
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x˜g,i
)
= −
r∑
g=1
σ2g , (1.1)
where the subscript on the expectations operator indicates that the expectation is taken
under the null of random assignment, and we have assumed that E0(x˜2g,i) =: σ2g does not
vary across individuals. This urn-level homoskedasticity assumption can be dispensed with
and we do so below. Furthermore, it will turn out that, when peer groups are mutually
exclusive, the test derived under this homoskedasticity assumption is, in fact, robust to
heteroskedasticity.
Equation (1.1) implies that the within-group estimator is inconsistent under asymptotics
where the number of urns grows large but their size is held fixed. In the Appendix we show
that (under the null)
plimr→∞ ρˆ = −
limr→∞ 1r
∑r
g=1 σ
2
g
limr→∞ 1r
∑r
g=1 σ
2
g E0
(∑ng
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 1
ng
∑ng
i=1
∑ng
j=1
mg(i∩ j)
mg(i)mg(j)
) , (1.2)
where mg(i ∩ j) :=
∑ng
k=1(Ag)i,k (Ag)k,j is the number of peers that individuals i and j
have in common. The probability limit is always negative. All else equal its magnitude is
decreasing in urn sizes and increasing in the degree of overlap between peer groups. When
peer groups do not overlap it is also increasing in the size of the peer groups. Furthermore,
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in the special case where all urns are of size n and are partitioned into peer groups of a
common size m,
plimr→∞ ρˆ = −
m
n− 1 ,
which no longer depends on the urn variances. This expression co-incides with the one
reported in Proposition 1 of Caeyers and Fafchamps (2020).
The implication of the inconsistency is that the regression-based test will be biased
toward negative alternatives and that its size will tend to one as the number of urns grows
large.
1.2 A corrected test
The bias calculated in (1.1) is surprisingly simple and suggests a natural adjustment to
the test statistic of Sacerdote (2001). Observe that an unbiased estimator of σ2g (under the
null) is
1
ng − 1
ng∑
i=1
xg,i x˜g,i.
Therefore, the re-centered covariance
qHOr :=
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x˜g,i +
r∑
g=1
1
ng − 1
ng∑
i=1
xg,i x˜g,i =
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
)
will be exactly unbiased under random assignment. An estimator of the standard deviation
of qHOr is a conventional standard error that clusters observations at the urn level. It equals
sHOr :=
√√√√ r∑
g=1
(
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
))2
.
Hence, an adjusted test statistic is tHOr := q
HO
r /s
HO
r . Note that the entire construction
of this statistic is based on calculations under the null. As such it is in the spirit of a
Lagrange-multiplier test.3
3Note that tHOr can equally be viewed as a convential t-statistic—obtained through a bias-corrected
within-group regression—that uses a standard error that is constructed under the null.
7
Theorem 1 states the asymptotic behavior of the statistic tHOr under the null and under
alternatives where E(sHOr ) = br for a sequence of constants br = O(r). Illustrations of
Pitman drifts of this type are given below.
Theorem 1. Let P(ng > 2) = 1. If maxg,i E(x8g,i) = O(1) and maxg,i(E(x2g,i))−1 = O(1),
then
tHOr −
br
sHOr
d→ N(0, 1),
as r →∞.
It is easy to verify that urns of size two would not contribute to the test statistic and so can
be dropped. Hence the need for the first condition in the theorem. The second condition
contains standard moment requirements.
An implication of the theorem is that, for any α ∈ (0, 1),
lim
r→∞
P0
(
tHOr > z1−α
)
= α,
where zα is the α-quantile of the standard-normal distribution. One-sided and two-sided
tests then follow in the usual manner. The theorem also implies that the test is consistent
against any alternative for which br does not vanish faster than
√
r. We turn to such
deviations next.
The bias adjustment in qHOr is smaller for urns of larger size. This may suggest that
in settings where peers are drawn from large urns, ignoring the bias issue in the test of
Sacerdote (2001) is inconsequential (Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2009). Such reasoning
ignores the fact that the standard deviation of qHOr , too, is decreasing in urn sizes. The
conclusion, in line with results in the panel data literature (e.g., Hahn and Kuersteiner
2002), is that the bias will only be ignorable for testing purposes when the size of the urns
is substantially larger than the number of urns. We note, though, that in such a case the
usual cluster-robust variance estimator should not be used. Alternative variance estimators
are provided in Stock and Watson (2008).
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1.3 Power calculations
We consider three types of local alternatives, where xg,i is correlated across peers. In the
terminology of Manski (1993) these are (i) endogenous effects, (ii) contextual effects, and
(iii) correlated effects. We begin by providing a closed-form expression four the variance of
qHOr under the null. We then calculate br under the alternatives (i)–(iii). Taken together,
these results then yield the non-centrality parameter in the limit distribution of tHOr . This
is then used to assess power.
Throughout this subsection we focus attention on settings where peer groups do not
overlap, which makes the final expressions more easily interpretable. We also enforce that
E0(x4g,i) = 3σ4g , which yields a slightly shorter variance formula but is in no way essential
to our findings. The underlying derivations in the Appendix do not make use of these
restrictions.
Variance expression. Under these conditions the variance of rHOr under the null is equal
to
vHOr := E0(qHOr qHOr ) = 2
r∑
g=1
σ4g E0
(
ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− ng
ng − 1
)
. (1.3)
We observe that vHOr is increasing in the size of the urns and decreasing in the size of the
peer groups.
Endogenous effects. In our first set of alternatives correlation among peers arises
through
xg,i = ρ x¯g,[i] + εg,i, εg,i ∼ independent (αg, σ2g),
where −1 < ρ < 1 and the εg,i are independent of the matrix Ag. A drifting sequence of
this model towards the null is obtained by setting ρ = %/
√
r for fixed values of %. Such
local alternatives imply that
br = 2
%√
r
r∑
g=1
σ2g E
(
ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− ng
ng − 1
)
. (1.4)
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Note that this term depends on the design in the same way as does vHOr and so the same
comparative statistics apply. Taken together, by an application of Theorem 1, tHOr will
converge in distribution to a normal random variable with mean µ := limr→∞ br/
√
vHOr
and variance one. The larger µ (in magnitude) the smaller the probability of a type-II
error. The non-centrality parameter µ is even simpler when errors are homoskedastic and
the adjacency matrices A1, . . . ,Ar are drawn from a common distribution as, in that case,
µ = %
√√√√2E( ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− ng
ng − 1
)
,
showing that power is monotone increasing in the (expected) size of the urns and decreasing
in the size of the peer groups. When variances are urn specific the expression for µ is to
be multiplied by
lim
r→∞
1√
r
∑r
g=1 σ
2
g√∑r
g=1 σ
4
g
≤ 1,
where the bound follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. Hence, urn-specific variances
are always power reducing. Nonetheless, note that µ > 0, and so our test will detect
endogenous-effect violations with probability approaching one for all possible configurations
of urn sizes and peer groups.
Contextual effects. In our second class of alternatives correlation in peer characteristics
comes from (latent) exogenous effects. Moreover,
xg,i = εg,i +
θ
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j εg,j, εg,i ∼ independent (αg, σ2g)
where θ is a finite constant and, again, the εg,i are independent of the matrix Ag. For
drifting sequences of the form θ = ϑ/
√
r,
br = 2
ϑ√
r
r∑
g=1
σ2g E
(
ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− ng
ng − 1
)
, (1.5)
which is the identical to the bias under an endogenous-effect alternative where % = ϑ.
Consequently, endogenous and exogenous effects are locally asymptotically equivalent. This
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finding is not surprising in light of the similar results on autoregressive and moving-average
alternatives in classical testing problems in the time series literature (see, for example,
Godfrey 1981).
Correlated effects. In our third class of alternatives peers are subject to a common
additive shock drawn from a distribution with variance σ2η, independent of everything else.
Thus (conditional on an urn fixed effect) the variance of xg,i is equal to σ
2
η + σ
2
g while the
covariance between characteristics of peers is σ2η. In this case, the relevant drifting sequence
has σ2η = ς
2/
√
r and we find that the bias in qHOr equals
br =
ς2√
r
r∑
g=1
E
(
(ng − 1)− 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
mg(i)
ng − 1
)
. (1.6)
Because
∑ng
i=1mg(i) ≤ ng(ng − 1), with equality if and only if all individuals in urn g are
each others peers we again have that br > 0 and so our test will be consistent against all
correlated-effect alternatives. When σ2g = σ
2 and the matrices A1, . . . ,Ar are drawn from
a common distribution, the non-centrality parameter in the limit distribution of our test
statistic is
µ =
ς2
σ2
E
(
(ng − 1)− 1ng
∑ng
i=1
mg(i)
ng−1
)
√
2E
(∑ng
i=1
1
mg(i)
− ng
ng−1
) .
Power is again increasing in n1, . . . , nr. The impact of the size of the peers groups on power
is less clear cut, however. On the one hand, larger peer groups reduce the variance and
increase µ. On the other hand, they also reduce the bias in qHOr , resulting in a loss of power.
2 Connections to the literature
When there is variation in urn size Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) proposed to
augment the within-group regression of Sacerdote (2001) by including the leave-one-out
average
1
ng − 1
∑
j 6=i
xg,j =
ng
ng − 1
(
1
ng
ng∑
j=1
xg,j − xg,i
ng
)
=
ng
ng − 1
(
xg − xg,i
ng
)
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as an additional regressor. The within-group transformation sweeps out all terms that do
not vary within urns, and so the approach is equivalent to a within-group regression of xg,i
on x¯g,[i] and xg,i/(ng − 1). This highlights why variation in urn size is required. When
ng does not vary across urns this regression will yield a perfect fit that satisfies the null
whether or not peer assignment is random. Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) offer
an intuition of why their strategy yields size control and provide supporting simulations.
However, a theoretical analysis of the test is, to our knowledge, not available.
Calculations summarized in the Appendix reveal that the approach of Guryan, Kroft
and Notowidigdo (2009) tests whether
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
) (
1− δ
ng − 1
)
+ op(
√
r), (2.7)
is statistically different from zero. Here,
δ :=
limr→∞ 1r
∑r
g=1 σ
2
g
limr→∞ 1r
∑r
g=1 σ
2
g E0
(
1
ng−1
) ,
is the probability limit of the slope coefficient of a within-group regression of xg,i on
xg,i/(ng − 1), under the null. The summand in the leading term in (2.7) is equal to the
summand in qHOr , up to a scale factor that varies at the urn level. This factor is bounded
and so, by virtue of Theorem 1, we conclude that the test will indeed exhibit correct size
in large samples.
The limited simulation evidence available suggests that the test of Guryan, Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2009) may suffer from low power; see Stevenson (2015) and also the extended
version of her analysis in the Appendix. Because the approach requires variation in urn
sizes one may expect the test to be particularly underpowered when such variation is limited
(Stevenson 2015, Caeyers and Fafchamps 2020). While this is true, low power can also arise
from a different source. Equation (2.7) is again useful here. Consider a design where urns
are of size n¯1 with probability (1− pn) and of size n¯2 with probability pn, where n¯1 < n¯2.
Then the non-centrality parameter of the test statistic can be shown to equal
µ∗ :=
√
pn(1− pn) b(n¯2)− b(n¯1)√
v(n¯1) pn + v(n¯2) (1− pn)
, (2.8)
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where b(n) and v2(n) are the bias and variance of
∑ng
i=1 x˜g,i (x¯g,[i] +xg,i/(ng−1)) conditional
on ng = n. This equation confirms that µ
∗ → 0 as pn(1−pn)→ 0 and formalizes the notion
that the test will tend to have low power when variation in urn sizes is small. The formula
also shows that the test will have trivial asymptotic power when b(n¯1)− b(n¯2) = 0, i.e., in
designs where the bias contributions coming from the different urn sizes cancel each other
out.
We confirm these findings in Figures 1 and 2 for designs where each of 25 urns contains
six individuals with probability pn and four individuals with probability 1 − pn. Within
earns of size four, each individual is assigned one peer at random while in the larger urn
peer groups are of size three with probability pm and of size two with probability 1 − pm.
Figure 1 plots (theoretical) power against endogenous (or, equivalently, contextual) effect
alternatives, with ρ (or, equivalently, θ) on the horizontal axis. Figure 2 displays power
against correlated-effect alternatives, with σ2η/σ
2 on the horizontal axis. The plots in each
figure are arranged so that pn increases when going down rows and pm increases when
moving through columns. Dashed curves refer to our test. Dashed-dotted curves represent
the test of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009). Both tests are two-sided at the 5%
level; a dashed horizontal line marks the size.
Figure 1 shows high power for our test across all designs. The test of Guryan, Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2009) is uniformly less powerful, and substantially so. There is a reduction
in its power when pn moves away from .50 (i.e., across rows). For the values considered
here, this effect is small relative to the impact of changing pm, with power initially going
down considerably when pm moves from .25 to .50, and afterwards essentially flattening
out completely when pm = .75. This is a reflection of the numerator in µ
∗ getting close
to zero; the bias in urns of size four cancels out with the bias in urns of size six. As µ∗ is
multiplicative in ρ these changes are uniform on (−1, 1).
Figure 2 shows our test also has high power against correlated-effect alternatives. The
power gain in the test of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) as σ2η/σ
2 moves further
away from zero (the null) trails behind considerably. However, in contrast to the pattern
in Figure 1, we do not observe trivial power in any of the configurations. The reason for
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Figure 1: Power analysis for endogenous- and exogenous-effect alternatives
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Power against endogenous/exogenous effect alternatives for our test (dashed line) and for the test of Guryan,
Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) (dashed-dotted line) in a design with two possible urns sizes (4 and 6) and
two possible peer-group sizes (2 and 3). pn := P(ng = 6) and pm := P(mg(i) = 2|ng = 6). A horizontal
dashed-dotted line indicates the size of the test. Plots are based on theoretical calculations and are for 25
urns.
this is that, here, for none of the combinations of pn and pm the numerator of µ
∗ is close to
zero. A close look will allow to verify that, here, power increases with pm. This is in line
with our formulas.
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) also describe an alternative permutation test
(see, e.g., Lehmann and Romano 2006, Chapter 15, for a general treatment of such tests)
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Figure 2: Power analysis for correlated-effect alternatives
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Power against correlated-effect alternatives for our test (dashed line) and for the test of Guryan, Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2009) (dashed-dotted line) in a design with two possible urns sizes (4 and 6) and two possible
peer-group sizes (2 and 3). pn := P(ng = 6) and pm := P(mg(i) = 2|ng = 6). A horizontal dashed-dotted
line indicates the size of the test. Plots are based on theoretical calculations and are for 25 urns.
that is based on the sampling distribution of the within-group estimator obtained from
randomly re-assigning individuals to peer groups within each urn. Randomization tests
have many attractive properties but require that individuals are exchangeable under the
null to be size correct. This is a substantial strenghtening of the requirements underlying
Theorem 1. A relevant data feature that would violate exchangeability is when xg,i is
heteroskedastic (in i), for example.
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Stevenson (2015) suggested an alternative approach based on data splitting. Although
its theoretical properties have not been established, the subsampling scheme proposed
circumvents bias under the null, at least when peer groups are mutually exclusive, and
so should lead to size correct inference in this case (under regularity conditions). Like
the permutation test, the scheme is also computationally much more demanding than our
bias-adjustment proposal.
3 Extensions
3.1 Heteroskedasticity
So far we have worked under an assumption of urn-level homoskedasticity. We now drop
this restriction and allow that σ2g,i := E0(x2g,i) varies both between and within urns in an
arbitrary way.
First, calculations analogous to those that gave rise to (1.1) show that, now
E0
(
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x˜g,i
)
= −
r∑
g=1
E0
(
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j σ
2
g,j
)
. (3.9)
Hence, the contribution of each urn to the bias equals (minus) the expected within-urn
mean of peer-group averaged variances.
Appealing to a result of Hartley, Rao and Kiefer (1969), we show in the Appendix that
an unbiased estimator of the bias in (3.9) is
−
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
ωg,i xg,i x˜g,i, ωg,i :=
1
ng − 2
∑
i′∈[i]
1
mg(i′)
− 1
ng − 1
 ,
which is again well-defined for all urns of size ng > 2. Hence, a modification of q
HO
r that is
robust to heteroskedasticity of arbitrary form is given by
qHCr :=
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] + ωg,i xg,i
)
, (3.10)
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which satisfies E0(qHCr ) = 0. It differs from qHOr only in that the weight (ng−1)−1 is replaced
by ωg,i, which varies at the individual level. Construction of ωg,i is nonetheless immediate
from Ag.
Observe that, in the important special case where peer groups do not overlap we have
mg(i
′) = mg(i) for all i′ ∈ [i], and so
ωg,i =
1
ng − 1 .
This is the weight we used to construct our test statistic in the homoskedastic case. It thus
follows that tHOr is robust to heteroskedasticity in this case.
The standard deviation of qHCr can be estimated by
sHCr :=
√√√√ r∑
g=1
(
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] + ωg,i xg,i
))2
.
A modified version of our test statistic that remains size correct under heteroskedasticity
of arbitrary form also when peer groups overlap is tHCr := q
HC
r /s
HC
r . This statistic is
asymptotically normal under the same conditions as before. In the following theorem,
br := E(qHCr ) = O(r).
Theorem 2. Let P(ng > 2) = 1. If maxg,i E(x8g,i) = O(1) and maxg,i(E(x2g,i))−1 = O(1),
then
tHCr −
br
sHCr
d→ N(0, 1),
as r →∞.
3.2 Controlling for covariates
There may be situations where, in addition to urn fixed effects, it is desirable to control
for other variables that vary at the individual level, wg,i. This would be needed when
randomization is assumed to take place within urns only conditional on these variables.
A intuitive regression-based solution would be to first partial-out wg,i from xg,i and then
proceed in constructing our test statistic as before. We next show that, under regularity
conditions, this approach is justified.
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Let x˙g,i denote the residual from an ordinary least-squares regression of xg,i on urn
dummies and the vector of covariates wg,i. Then the modified test statistic takes the form
tˆHOr :=
qˆHOr
sˆHOr
for
qˆHOr :=
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x˙g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
)
, sˆHOr :=
√√√√ r∑
g=1
(
ng∑
i=1
x˙g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
))2
.
The statistic tHCr can be modified in the same way.
To state conditions under which Theorem 1 generalizes to partialling-out covariates we
need
xˇg,i := xg,i −w′g,i
(
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i′=1
E(wg,i′w′g,i′)
)−1( r∑
g=1
ng∑
i′=1
E(wg,i′xg,i′)
)
.
This is the deviation of xg,i from its population linear projection on wg,i (and no fixed
effects).
The following theorem provides the result. Here, ‖·‖ refers to the Euclidean norm and
br is once more suitably re-defined to be the bias in qˆ
HO
r under Pitman drifts towards the
null hypothesis.
Theorem 3. Let P(ng > 2) = 1. If maxg,i E(xˇ8g,i) = O(1) and maxg,i(E(xˇ2g,i))−1 = O(1),
then
tˆHOr −
br
sˆHOr
d→ N(0, 1),
as r →∞, provided that E(xˇg,i|wg,1, . . . ,wg,ng) = αg for urn-specific constants α1, . . . , αr,
that maxg,i E(‖wg,i‖4) = O(1) and that the matrix limr→ r−1
∑r
g=1 E(w˜g,i w˜
′
g,i) has maximal
rank.
The conditions in this result are intuitive. First, the moment conditions on xg,i in Theorem 1
are replaced by corresponding conditions on xˇg,i. Next, the mean-independence assumption
is a requirement of strict exogeneity on wg,i. Finally, the conditions on the covariates are
needed to ensure that the residuals from the auxiliary least-squares regression converge to
their population counterparts.
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4 Illustrations
4.1 Randomization in professional golf tournaments
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) used the random assignment of golf players to
playing partners in professional golf tournaments to estimate peer effects. Their data
span the 2002, 2005, and 2006 seasons of the Professional Golfer’s Association (PGA)
and cover 81 tournaments. We refer to Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) for a
detailed description of the data. Here we only note the facts that are of direct relevance
to our analysis. Players in the PGA are, at any point in time, assigned to one of four
categories (cat 1, cat 1a, cat 2, and cat 3). At the start of each tournament, within these
four categories, playing partners are assigned to groups of three golfers. These (mutually
exclusive) peer groups play together for the first two rounds of the tournament. The analysis
is limited to the first round. Conditional on the set of players who enter a tournament,
the assignment is random within categories. Unconditional on this fully interacted set of
fixed effects, assignment to groups is not random (Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo, 2009,
p. 40). Random assignment is tested by looking at the (corrected) within-group correlation
between a measure of a golfer’s ability and the average ability of his peers in the reference
group.
The chief measure of ability used to do this is an estimate of the number of strokes more
than 72 (i.e., above par) that a golfer typically takes in a round, on an average course, that
is used for PGA tournaments. The more negative this number the better the player. Table
1 contains descriptive statistics for this variable, stratified by the four player categories. It
shows that, broadly, average ability is higher in lower numbered categories, and that there
remains substantial variation in this measure even conditional on category. To get a sense
of urn sizes in these data the table also provides descriptive statistics of the number of
players by tournament (tourn) and by tournament-by-category. The latter are based on
a total of 8,791 observations in stead of the total of 8,801 observations as 10 observations
concern urns of a size less than three; recall that such urns do not contain any information
for our purposes. We also included the same descriptive statistics for the weights (ng−1)−1.
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Table 1: The PGA data
n obs mean std min max
ability (xg,i)
cat 1 3,205 -3.138 0.769 -5.159 1.440
cat 1a 3,436 -2.808 0.740 -4.326 6.732
cat 2 1,503 -2.857 0.894 -4.776 3.275
cat 3 657 -1.662 1.470 -4.776 6.315
peer ability (x¯g,[i])
cat 1 3,205 -3.132 0.599 -5.081 0.672
cat 1a 3,436 -2.811 0.591 -4.530 3.275
cat 2 1,503 -2.850 0.744 -4.776 3.275
cat 3 657 -1.690 1.270 -4.776 6.315
urn size (ng)
tourn 8,801 111.942 18.414 62 144
tourn by cat 8,791 39.292 16.869 3 83
weight ((ng − 1)−1)
tourn 8,801 0.009 0.002 0.007 0.016
tourn by cat 8,791 0.037 0.040 0.012 0.500
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The test statistics for the default (i.e., uncorrected) regression-based test, our corrected
version, and the test where leave-me-out urn means are controlled for are collected in Table
2. The numbers in square brackets below are corresponding (two-sided) p-values. When
fully stratifying the data by tournament and category we observe that the default test
rejects the null of random assignment and would suggest there to be negative assortative
matching between players. The other two tests have large p-values, finding little evidence
to contradict the null. Recall that the assignment of players to groups is not random when
not controlling for categories. We would hope that both tests capture this violation from
the null. Our corrected test does this; its p-value drops from .394 to .000. The test of
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) on the other hand continues to suggest that golfers
are randomly assigned; its p-value actually increases from .227 to .329. This type-II error
is in line with our theoretical results on this test.
Table 2: Results for the PGA data
stratification default corrected control
tourn 7.524 4.288 -0.976
[0.000] [0.000] [0.329]
tourn by cat -3.957 -0.852 -1.209
[0.000] [0.394] [0.227]
We conclude this illustration by highlighting a caveat to the analysis of these data.
Most, if not all, professional golf players participate to multiple tournaments per year and
are also active for multiple years. Consequently, many players will appear in multiple urns,
albeit with a different value for their ability measure, as this is updated over time. This, of
course, induces dependence across urns which is in violation with our working assumption
that urns are independent.
4.2 Peer effects in the classroom
We use data collected as part of Project STAR to test for the presence of peer effects
among kindergarten students. These data are well known and have been used extensively.
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The data set we is borrowed from Graham (2008). It covers 317 kindergarten classrooms
in the state of Tennessee. A summary of the data is given in Table 3. We have SAT
scores for mathematics taken at the end of the year (math), and dummies for gender
(girl), ethnicity (black), and eligibility for free school meals (lunch). The SAT scores are
standardized to have mean zero and unit variance. On entering kindergarten students
were randomly assigned to one of three class types. There has been debate on whether
students were also randomly assigned to classes; see Graham (2008), Chetty et al. (2011),
and Sojourner (2013). The concensus seems to be that violations appear small, especially
at the kindergarten level.
Table 3: The Project STAR data
n obs mean std min max
math score 5,724 0.000 1.000 -4.129 2.943
peer math 5,724 0.000 0.581 -1.616 2.123
girl 5,724 0.486 0.500 0 1
black 5,724 0.327 0.469 0 1
lunch 5,724 0.480 0.500 0 1
class size 317 18.057 3.965 9 27
If we let xg,i be the SAT score of student i in classroom g and collect her observed
characteristics in the vector wg,i a linear-in-means model with a classroom fixed effect αg
takes the form
xg,i = ρ x¯g,[i] +w
′
g,iβ + w¯
′
g,[i]γ + αg + εg,i,
where εg,i captures remaining unobserved factors and w¯g,[i] is the average of wg,j for j ∈ [i].
Here, endogenous peer effects correspond to ρ 6= 0, contextual peer effects correspond to
γ = 0, and correlated effects (in addition to those not captured by the αg) correspond to
the latent εg,i being correlated within classrooms.
Table 4 provides the value of our test statistic for the null of no peer effects for three
different specifications. For completeness it also contains its uncorrected counterpart. The
baseline specification controls only for classroom fixed effects. Here, the null is strongly
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rejected. The second specification additionally controls for the observed characteristics of
the students. In this case, we no longer find evidence of peer effects. The same is true if we
augment the control variables by the average characteristics of the peers. Thus, we do not
find evidence of any type of spillover effects once background characteristics are controlled
for.
Table 4: Results for the Project STAR data
default corrected default corrected default corrected
test statistic -56.710 4.215 -55.710 -1.295 -56.085 1.211
p-value (two sided) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.226
class fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
controls of peers No No No No Yes Yes
An alternative to our direct test would be to estimate the linear-in-means model and
explicitely test for the presence of endogenous and exogenous effects. Because classrooms
do not overlap this cannot be done through the popular instrumental-variable approach
of Bramoulle´, Djebbari and Fortin (2009) and De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010)
that hinges on partial overlap between peer groups. Exploiting the variation in class size,
Rose (2017) (extending the work of Graham 2008) used the identifying power in second
moments of test scores to back out estimates of endogenous and exogenous effects in our
data. Both point estimates (in his Specification 3 in Table 2) came out as insignificant at
all conventional significance levels. This result is in line with the conclusion obtained here.
It is noted in Rose (2017, p. S55) that identification of the full model in the Project STAR
setting may be weak. This aids in rationalizing the large standard errors he obtains. It
also highlights the usefulness of a test for the presence of peer effects that circumvents the
need for a consistent estimator of the unrestricted model.
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Conclusion
Random assignment of individuals to peer groups has proven to be a powerful tool for
credible identification of spillover effects. In non-experimental designs it needs to be argued
that assignment is ‘as good as’ random. This paper has presented a simple test to do so.
Its properties were derived and a comparison to alternative test available the literature has
been made.
Peer groups may be of different sizes and need not be mutually exclusive. Variation in
the size of the urns from which peers are drawn is allowed but is not necessary. Individuals
within urns are not assumed to be exchangeable under the null. Theoretical analysis verifies
that the test is consistent against endogenous effects, contextual effects, and correlated
effects. We also provide theoretical results that illustrate substantial power improvements
over the test of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009). These calculations also clarify why
this test will often have low power.
In a first empirical illustration we verify random assignment in the professional golfer
data of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009). Within tournaments, participating players
are randomly assigned to playing partners from the same category. Like theirs, our test
confirms this. Assignment is not random when not controlling for categories. While our
test successfully detects this violation, theirs does not.
In a second empirical example we use our approach to test for the presence of peer
effects in educational achievement. Using data on SAT scores in kindergarten collected as
part of Project STAR we do not find evidence of peer effects once student characteristics
and classroom fixed effects are accounted for.
Appendix
Normalization. Our procedures accommodate fixed effects at the urn level. Moreover, all
sample statistics involved are functions of observations from which the within-urn mean has been
subtracted and are, thus, invariant to the fixed effects. Therefore, it is without loss of generality
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to set all fixed effects equal to zero. This implies that
E0(xg,i xg,j) =
 σ2g if i = j0 if i 6= j . (A.1)
This normalization simplifies the derivations below and is maintained throughout the Appendix.
Proof of Equation (1.1). Under the null of random assignment the bias in the normal
equation is
E0
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x˜g,i
 = r∑
g=1
E0
( ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] xg,i
)
−
r∑
g=1
E0
( ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] xg
)
.
We first calculate each of the expectations on the right-hand side and then collect results to arrive
at (1.1).
For the first term on the right-hand side, observe that
E0
( ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] xg,i
)
= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j xg,j xg,i
mg(i)

= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j E0(xg,j xg,i|Ag)
mg(i)

= 0,
where the first equality uses the definition of x¯g,[i], the second equality iterates expectations, and
the final equality follows from the fact that E0(xg,i xg,j |Ag) = E0(xg,i xg,j) = 0 for all i 6= j and
the accounting identity
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j = mg(i).
For the second term on the right-hand side, we have
E0
( ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] xg
)
= E0
 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
j′=1
(Ag)i,j xg,j xg,j′
mg(i)

= E0
 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
j′=1
(Ag)i,j E0(xg,j xg,j′)
mg(i)

= E0
 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j E0(x2g,j)
mg(i)

= σ2g ,
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using the same arguments as for the first term.
Taking differences of the expectations just calculated and summing over the r urns now shows
that
E0
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x˜g,i
 = − r∑
g=1
σ2g ,
which is Equation (1.1).
Proof of Equation (1.2). The within-group estimator is
ρˆ :=
∑r
g=1
∑ng
i=1 x¯g,[i] x˜g,i∑r
g=1
∑ng
i=1 x¯g,[i] ˜¯xg,[i]
.
The expectation (under the null) of the numerator has already been calculated in (1.1) so it
remains only to calculate the expectation of the denominator, E0(
∑r
g=1
∑ng
i=1 x¯g,[i] ˜¯xg,[i]). Using
the definition of x¯g,[i], it can be written as
r∑
g=1
E0
 ng∑
i=1
 ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j xg,j
mg(i)
2− r∑
g=1
E0
 1
ng
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j xg,j
mg(i)
2 .
As in the proof of (1.1) we again start by calculating each of the expectations involved and then
collect results.
To calculate the expectation in the first term we expand the square and iterate expectations to
write
E0
 ng∑
i=1
 ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j xg,j
mg(i)
2 = E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
j′=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i,j′ E0(xg,j xg,j′)
mg(i)2

= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)
2
i,j E0(x2g,j)
mg(i)2

= E0
( ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
)
σ2g ,
where we have first exploited (A.1) and then used
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j = mg(i) together with the fact
that (Ag)
2
i,j = (Ag)i,j .
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To calculate the expectation in the second term, we proceed in the same way. Doing so reveals
that
E0
 1
ng
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j xg,j
mg(i)
2 = E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j′=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j′ E0(xg,j xg,j′)
ngmg(i)mg(i′)

= E0
(
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j E0(x2g,j)
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
= E0
(
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
mg(i ∩ i′)
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
σ2g ,
where we recall that
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j = mg(i ∩ i′).
Taking differences of the two expectations just calculated and summing over the r urns yields
E0
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] ˜¯xg,[i]
 = r∑
g=1
E0
 ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
mg(i ∩ j)
mg(i)mg(j)
σ2g .
Combined with (1.1) this yields (1.2) on letting r →∞.
The comparative statics in ng and mg(i ∩ j) are immediate. When peer groups do not overlap,
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
mg(i ∩ j)
mg(i)mg(j)
=
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
mg(i ∩ i) +
∑
j 6=img(i ∩ j)
mg(i)2
=
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
(
1
mg(i)
+
∑
j 6=i(Ag)i,j (mg(i)− 1)
mg(i)2
)
=
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
(
1
mg(i)
+
mg(i)− 1
mg(i)
)
= 1,
(A.2)
implying that, in this case the expectation of the denominator simplifies to
r∑
g=1
E0
( ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 1
)
σ2g ,
which is indeed decreasing in the mg(i).
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Proof of Theorem 1. By independence of the urns the variance of qHOr is
vHOr :=
r∑
g=1
E0
( ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
))2 .
We need to prove that
(i)
qHOr − br√
vHOr
d→ N(0, 1), and (ii)
(
sHOr −
√
vHOr
)
p→ 0
We handle each of these in turn. As subtracting br amounts to a mere recentering of q
HO
r to make
it zero mean it suffices to set br = 0.
To show (i) we verify that the conditions of Lyapunov’s central limit theorem are met. Here,
Lyapunov’s condition is
lim
r→∞
∑r
g=1 E
(∣∣∣∑ngi=1 x˜g,i (x¯g,[i] + xg,ing−1)∣∣∣2+δ)(∑r
g=1 E
((∑ng
i=1 x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng−1
))2)) 2+δ2 = 0,
for some δ > 0. To do so it is useful to introduce
λgi,j :=
 1/(ng − 1) if i = j(Ag)i,j/mg(i) if i 6= j
Then we can write
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
)
=
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
λi,j x˜g,i xg,j =
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(
λgi,j −
ng
ng − 1
)
xg,i xg,j ,
where we use that n−1g
∑ng
j=1 λi,j = ng/(ng − 1). Let δ > 0 be fixed. Then, by an application of
Ho¨lder’s inequality,
E

∣∣∣∣∣∣
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(
λgi,j −
ng
ng − 1
)
xg,i xg,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2+δ
 ≤
E
max
i,j
∣∣∣∣λgi,j − ngng − 1
∣∣∣∣
(2+δ)(1+θ)
θ
 θ1+θ
×
E

 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
|xg,i xg,j |
(2+δ)(1+θ)


1
1+θ
,
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for some θ > 0. The first right-hand side term is finite for any choice of θ because the (re-centered)
weights λgi,j−ng/(ng−1) are bounded. For second right-hand side term, letting ε := 2θ+δ+δθ > 0,
E
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
|xg,i xg,j |
2+ε ≤ E
( ng∑
i=1
|xg,i|
)4+2ε ≤ E(( ng∑
i=1
|xg,i|4+2ε
)
ng
)
= O(1)
because maxg maxi E(|xg,i|4+δ) <∞ by assumption. Consequently,
r∑
g=1
E
∣∣∣∣∣
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
)∣∣∣∣∣
2+δ
 = O(r),
and Lyapunov’s condition will follow if we can show that vHOr grows at the rate r. We may again
write
E
( ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
))2 = E
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(
λgi,j −
ng
ng − 1
)
xg,i xg,j
2 .
Expanding the square inside the expectation, iteration expectations, and recalling that we have
normalized the data to have mean zero yields
E
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(
λgi,j −
ng
ng − 1
)
xg,i xg,j
2 = E( ng∑
i=1
(
λgi,i −
ng
ng − 1
)2
E(x4g,i)
)
+ E
( ng∑
i=1
(
λgi,j −
ng
ng − 1
)2
σ4g
)
+ E
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(
λgi,i −
ng
ng − 1
)(
λgj,j −
ng
ng − 1
)
σ4g

+ E
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(
λgi,j −
ng
ng − 1
)(
λgj,i −
ng
ng − 1
)
σ4g
 .
Each of these terms is non-zero and bounded. Hence, vHOr , which is the sum of all these terms
over the r urns, grows at the rate r and Lyapunov’s condition holds.
To show (ii) it suffices to confirm that
E
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(
λgi,j −
ng
ng − 1
)
xg,i xg,j
4
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is bounded by a constant independent of g. Expanding the square and iterating expectations
shows that this is indeed the case, as the urn sizes are fixed, the weights are uniformly bounded,
and E(x8g,i) <∞. The consistency result is then a consequence of Kolmogorov’s strong law. This
completed the proof.
Proof of Equation (1.3). We need to compute the variance of
qHOr =
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
)
under the null of random assignment. The calculations here allow for overlap between peer groups
and allow for E0(x4g,i) =: γ4g to depend on g (but not on i). Recall that qHOr has mean zero (under
the null) by construction. By independence of the urns its variance is
vHOr :=
r∑
g=1
E0
( ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
))2 ,
which on expanding the sum is equal to
r∑
g=1
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
))(
x˜g,i′
(
x¯g,[i′] +
xg,i′
ng − 1
)))
. (A.3)
We first calculate the expectation of each of the cross-terms in this last expression and then
combine the results.
The first term that needs to be calculated is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x˜g,i x˜g,i′ x¯g,[i] x¯g,[i′]
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x¯g,[i] x¯g,[i′] (xg,i − xg) (xg,i′ − xg)
)
,
and expands as
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x¯g,[i] x¯g,[i′] xg,i xg,i′
)
− 2E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x¯g,[i] x¯g,[i′] xg,i xg
)
+E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x¯g,[i] x¯g,[i′] x
2
g
)
.
We now calculate each of the three expectations involved and collect results.
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The first expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x¯g,[i] x¯g,[i′] xg,i xg,i′
)
= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
j′=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j′ E0(xg,i xg,i′ xg,j xg,j′)
mg(i)mg(i′)

= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i,j E0(x2g,i x2g,j)
mg(i)mg(i)

+ E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)j,i E0(x2g,i x2g,j)
mg(i)mg(j)

= E0
( ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
)
σ4g + E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j
mg(i)mg(j)
σ4g ,
where we have used the definition of x¯g,[i] together with the observation that only summands for
which (i) i = i′ and j = j′ or (ii) i = j′ and j = i′ deliver a non-zero contribution. This follows
from the fact that the xg,i within each urn are independent under the null (conditional on their
common urn fixed effect).
The second expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x¯g,[i] x¯g,[i′] xg,i xg
)
= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
j′=1
ng∑
k=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j′ E0(xg,i xg,j xg,j′ xg,k)
mg(i)mg(i′)ng

= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j E0(x2g,i x2g,j)
mg(i)mg(i′)ng

+ E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,i E0(x2g,i x2g,j)
mg(i)mg(i′)ng

= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j
mg(i)mg(i′)ng
)
σ4g + σ
4
g
= E0
(
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
mg(i ∩ i′)
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
σ4g + σ
4
g ,
which follows by the same arguments, now only retaining summands for which (i) j′ = j and
k = i or (ii) j′ = i and k = j.
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The third expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x¯g,[i] x¯g,[i′] x
2
g
)
= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
j′=1
ng∑
k=1
ng∑
k′=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j′ E0(xg,j xg,j′ xg,k xg,k′)
mg(i)mg(i′)n2g

= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
k=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j E0(x2g,j x2g,k)
mg(i)mg(i′)n2g

+ 2E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
j′=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j′ E0(x2g,j x2g,j′)
mg(i)mg(i′)n2g

= E0
(
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j (Ag)i′,j
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
σ4g
+ 2E0
(
1
n2g
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j
∑ng
j′=1(Ag)i′,j′
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
σ4g
= E0
(
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
mg(i ∩ i′)
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
σ4g + 2σ
4
g ,
where, now, three types of summands contribute; they are those for which (i) j′ = j and k′ = k
or (ii) k = j and k′ = j′ or (iii) k = j′ and k′ = j.
Putting everything together shows that E0
(∑ng
i=1
∑ng
i′=1 x˜g,i x˜g,i′ x¯g,[i] x¯g,[i′]
)
is equal to
E0
 ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
mg(i ∩ j)
mg(i)mg(j)
+
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j
mg(i)mg(j)
σ4g , (A.4)
which deals with the first term in (A.3).
The second term that needs to be calculated is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x˜g,i x˜g,i′ x¯g,[i] xg,i′
(ng − 1)
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(xg,i − xg) (xg,i′ − xg) x¯g,[i] xg,i′
(ng − 1)
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
xg,i x¯g,[i] x
2
g,i′
(ng − 1)
)
− E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
xg,i xg x¯g,[i] xg,i′
(ng − 1)
)
− E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
xg x¯g,[i] x
2
g,i′
(ng − 1)
)
+ E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x2g x¯g,[i] xg,i′
(ng − 1)
)
.
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We evaluate each of these expectations in turn next.
The first expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
xg,i x¯g,[i] x
2
g,i′
(ng − 1)
)
= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j E0(xg,i x2g,i′ xg,j)
mg(i) (ng − 1)
 = 0,
which follows from the fact that (Ag)i,i = 0 so that no combination of indices gives raise to a
summand that has non-zero mean.
The second expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
xg,i xg x¯g,[i] xg,i′
(ng − 1)
)
= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
k=1
(Ag)i,j E0(xg,i xg,i′ xg,j xg,k)
mg(i)ng (ng − 1)

= 2E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j E0(x2g,i x2g,j)
mg(i)ng (ng − 1)

= 2E0
(
1
(ng − 1)
)
σ4g ,
where the summands that contribute are those for which (i) i′ = i and k = j or (ii) i′ = j and
k = i.
The third expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
xg x¯g,[i] x
2
g,i′
(ng − 1)
)
= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
k=1
(Ag)i,j E0(x2g,i′ xg,j xg,k)
mg(i)ng (ng − 1)

= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j E0(x2g,i′ x
2
g,j)
mg(i)ng (ng − 1)

= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(Ag)i,i′ E0(x4g,i′) +
∑
j 6=i′(Ag)i,j E0(x2g,i′ x
2
g,j)
mg(i)ng (ng − 1)
)
= E0
(
1
(ng − 1)
)
γ4g + E0
(
1
ng(ng − 1)
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
mg(i)− (Ag)i,i′
mg(i)
)
σ4g
= E0
(
1
(ng − 1)
)
γ4g + σ
4
g ;
note that, here, only summands for which k = j contribute, but their contribution depends on
whether (i) i′ = j (which contributes a fourth-order moment) or whether (ii) i′ 6= j (which
contributes a squared second moment).
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The fourth expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x2g x¯g,[i] xg,i′
(ng − 1)
)
= E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
k=1
ng∑
k′=1
(Ag)i,j E0(xg,i′ xg,j xg,k xg,k′)
mg(i)n2g (ng − 1)

= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(Ag)i,i′ E0(x4g,i′) + 3
∑
j 6=i′(Ag)i,j E0(x2g,i′ x
2
g,j)
mg(i)n2g (ng − 1)
)
= E0
(
1
ng(ng − 1)
)
γ4g + 3E0
(
1
ng
)
σ4g .
Here, again, a fourth-order term arises from the summands where i′ = j = k = k′ while three
different combinations of indices contribute terms involving σ4g ; these are those where (i) i
′ = j
and k = k′ (but not both) or (ii) i′ = k and k′ = j (but not both) or (iii) i′ = k′ and k = j (but
not both).
Combining results yields
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x˜g,i x˜g,i′ x¯g,[i] xg,i′
(ng − 1)
)
= E0
(
3
ng
− 2
(ng − 1) − 1
)
σ4g − E0
(
1
ng
)
γ4g , (A.5)
and gives (up to the factor 2) and expression for the second term in (A.3).
The third term and final term that needs to be calculated is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x˜g,i x˜g,i′ xg,i xg,i′
(ng − 1)2
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(xg,i − xg) (xg,i′ − xg)xg,i xg,i′
(ng − 1)2
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x2g,i x
2
g,i′
(ng − 1)2
)
− 2E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x2g,i xg,i′ xg
(ng − 1)2
)
+ E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
xg,i xg,i′ x
2
g
(ng − 1)2
)
.
This again requires calculating three distinct expectations, and we will again take on each in turn.
The first expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x2g,i x
2
g,i′
(ng − 1)2
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
E0(x4g,i) +
∑
i′ 6=i E0(x2g,i x2g,i′)
(ng − 1)2
)
= E0
(
ng
(ng − 1)2
)
γ4g + E0
(
ng
(ng − 1)
)
σ4g .
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The second expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x2g,i xg,i′ xg
(ng − 1)2
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
k=1
E0(x2g,i xg,i′ xg,k)
ng (ng − 1)2
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
E0(x4g,i) +
∑
i′ 6=i E0(x2g,i x2g,i′)
ng (ng − 1)2
)
= E0
(
1
(ng − 1)2
)
γ4g + E0
(
1
(ng − 1)
)
σ4g .
The third expectation is
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
xg,i xg,i′ x
2
g
(ng − 1)2
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
ng∑
k=1
ng∑
k′=1
E0(xg,i xg,i′ xg,k xg,k′)
n2g(ng − 1)2
)
= E0
( ng∑
i=1
E0(x4g,i) + 3
∑
i′ 6=i E0(x2g,i x2g,i′)
n2g(ng − 1)2
)
= E0
(
1
ng(ng − 1)2
)
γ4g + 3E0
(
1
ng(ng − 1)
)
σ4g .
This then yields
E0
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
x˜g,i x˜g,i′ xg,i xg,i′
(ng − 1)2
)
= E0
(
ng
(ng − 1)
(
1− 2
ng
+
3
n2g
))
σ4g
+ E0
(
ng
(ng − 1)2
(
1− 2
ng
+
1
n2g
))
γ4g
(A.6)
for the third and final term in (A.3).
Now, collecting results by combining (A.3) with (A.4)–(A.6) yields
vHOr =
r∑
g=1
E0
 ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
mg(i ∩ j)
mg(i)mg(j)
+
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j
mg(i)mg(j)
− (ng − 1)
2 + 2
ng(ng − 1)
σ4g
−
r∑
g=1
E0
(
1
ng
)
γ4g .
When γ4g = 3σ
4
g and peer groups do not overlap we obtain
vHOr =
r∑
g=1
E0
(
2
ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 1− ng + 1
ng − 1
)
σ4g
by (A.2). This is the variance formula stated in Equation (1.3) in the main text.
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Proof of Equation (1.4). Suppose that
xg,i = ρ x¯g,[i] + εg,i, εg,i ∼ independent (αg, σ2g),
for some |ρ| < 1. Maintaining our normalization, we set αg = 0 for all urns. Recall that, by
definition,
x¯g,[i] =
1
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j xg,j .
Consequently, collecting variables for urn g in xg := (xg,1, . . . , xg,ng)
′ and εg := (εg,1, . . . , εg,ng)′
and letting
Gg := D
−1
g Ag, Dg := diag(mg(1), . . . ,mg(ng)),
we have the linear system
xg = ρGg xg + εg,
which has reduced form
xg = (Ing − ρGg)−1 εg =
∞∑
o=0
(
ρoGog
)
εg.
Moreover,
xg,i = εg,i + ρ
1
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j εg,j + ρ
2 1
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
k=1
(Ag)i,j (Ag)j,k εg,k + · · · . (A.7)
We then obtain
E %√
r
(
xg,i xg,i′ |Ag
)
= E %√
r
(
εg,i εg,i′ |Ag
)
+ E %√
r
εg,i
 %√
r
1
mg(i′)
ng∑
j′=1
(Ag)i′,j′ εg,j′
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ag

+ E %√
r
εg,i′
 %√
r
1
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j εg,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ag

+ o(r−1/2).
The expectations on the right-hand side can be worked out. First we have
E %√
r
(εg,i εg,i′)|Ag) =
 σ2g if i = i′0 if i 6= i′ ,
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which mimics (A.1). Next we calculate
E %√
r
εg,i
 %√
r
1
mg(i′)
ng∑
j′=1
(Ag)i′,j′ εg,j′
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ag
 = %√
r
ng∑
j′=1
(Ag)i′,j′ E %√
r
(εg,i εg,j′ |Ag)
mg(i′)
=
%√
r
(Ag)i′,i E %√
r
(ε2g,i|Ag)
mg(i′)
=
%√
r
(Ag)i′,i
mg(i′)
σ2g
and, finally,
E %√
r
εg,i′
 %√
r
1
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j εg,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣Ag
 = %√
r
(Ag)i,i′
mg(i)
σ2g ,
follows in the same way. Putting everything together then reveals that, up to terms that are
o(r−1/2),
E %√
r
(
xg,i xg,i′ |Ag
)
=
 σ2g if i = i′%√
r
(
(Ag)i,i′
mg(i)
+
(Ag)i′,i
mg(i′)
)
σ2g if i 6= i′
. (A.8)
This expression is key in deriving the asymptotic bias, which we turn to next.
The bias is
E %√
r
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
) = r∑
g=1
E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
x˜g,ix¯g,[i]
)
+
r∑
g=1
E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i xg,i
ng − 1
)
.
We calculate each of the expectations in turn.
First, up to terms that are o(r−1/2),
E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
x˜g,ix¯g,[i]
)
= E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
xg,i x¯g,[i]
)
− E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
xg x¯g,[i]
)
=
 ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 2
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
mg(i ∩ j)
mg(i)mg(j)
+
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j
mg(i)mg(j)
σ2g %√r − σ2g ,
because,
E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
xg,i x¯g,[i]
)
= E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(Ag)i,i′ E %√
p
(xg,i xg,i′ |Ag)
mg(i)
)
= E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(Ag)i,i′
mg(i)2
+
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(Ag)i,i′
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
σ2g
%√
r
+ o(r−1/2)
= E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
+
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(Ag)i,i′
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
σ2g
%√
r
+ o(r−1/2),
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and
E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
xg x¯g,[i]
)
= E %√
r
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(Ag)i,i′
∑ng
k=1 E %√r (xg,k xg,i′ |Ag)
mg(i)ng

= E %√
r
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
(Ag)i,i′
(
E %√
r
(x2g,i′ |Ag) +
∑
k 6=i′ E %√r (xg,k xg,i′ |Ag)
)
mg(i)ng

= σ2g + E %√
r
(
2
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
∑
k 6=i′(Ag)i,i′ (Ag)i′,k
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
σ2g
%√
r
+ o(r−1/2)
= σ2g + E %√
r
(
2
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
i′=1
mg(i ∩ i′)
mg(i)mg(i′)
)
σ2g
%√
r
+ o(r−1/2),
where we have made extensive use of (A.8).
Second, again up to terms that are o(r−1/2),
E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i xg,i
ng − 1
)
= E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
x2g,i
ng − 1
)
− E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
xg,i xg
ng − 1
)
= E %√
r
(
ng
ng − 1
)
σ2g
− E %√
r
(
1
ng − 1
)
σ2g
− E %√
r
 1
ng(ng − 1)
ng∑
i=1
∑
i′ 6=i
(
(Ag)i,i′
mg(i)
+
(Ag)i,i′
mg(i′)
) %√
r
σ2g
= σ2g − E %√
r
(
2
ng − 1
)
%√
r
σ2g ,
again exploiting (A.8).
Hence, up to terms that are o(
√
r), the bias in the normal equation is
%√
r
p∑
g=1
E %√
r
 ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 2
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
mg(i ∩ j)
mg(i)mg(j)
+
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j
mg(i)mg(j)
− 2
ng − 1
σ2g .
When peer groups do not overlap we can exploit the fact that
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
mg(i ∩ j)
mg(i)mg(j)
= 1,
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j
mg(i)mg(j)
=
ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
,
to reduce the bias expression to
2
%√
r
p∑
g=1
E %√
r
( ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 1− 1
ng − 1
)
σ2g + o(
√
r).
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Because the adjacency matrices do not vary with the alternative the subscript on the expectations
operator in this expression can be dropped. This delivers Equation (1.4).
Proof of Equation (1.5). To see that endogenous effects and contextual effects are locally
asymptotically equivalent note that the latter violation of the null is of the form
xg,i = εg,i +
θ
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j εg,j , εg,i ∼ independent (αg, σ2g),
for drifting sequences θ = ϑ/
√
r. Our normalization again sets αg = 0 for all urns. Clearly,
on setting % = ϑ, this data generating process co-incides with the reduced form in (A.7), up to
first-order. Consequently, it is immediate that E ϑ√
r
(
xg,i xg,i′ |Ag
)
satisfies the expansions in (A.8).
This, then, implies that the asymptotic bias induced by contextual effects, too, is identical.
Proof of Equation (1.6). Consider non-overlapping peer groups. Peers are subject to a
common random effect drawn from a distribution with zero mean and variance σ2η. Consequently,
E ς2√
r
(
xg,i xg,i′ |Ag
)
= E ς2√
r
(
xg,i xg,i′ |(Ag)i,i′
)
.
For drifting sequences of the form σ2η = ς
2/
√
r this implies that
E ς2√
r
(
xg,i xg,i′ |(Ag)i,i′ = 0
) ς
2√
r
+ σ2g if i = i
′
0 if i 6= i′
, E ς2√
r
(
xg,i xg,i′ |(Ag)i,j = 1
)
=
ς2√
r
,
where, recall, the urn fixed effects have been normalized to zero.
We are now ready to tackle the calculation of
E ς2√
r
 p∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
) .
We again proceed by first calculating all expectations involved separately and then combining all
results.
First, we have
E ς2√
r
( ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i x¯g,[i]
)
= E ς2√
r
( ng∑
i=1
xg,i x¯g,[i]
)
− E ς2√
r
( ng∑
i=1
xg x¯g,[i]
)
= E ς2√
r
(ng − 2) ς
2
√
r
− σ2.
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This follows from the observations that
E ς2√
r
( ng∑
i=1
xg,i x¯g,[i]
)
= E ς2√
r
 ng∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(Ag)i,j E ς2√
r
(xg,i xg,j |Ag)
mg(i)

= E ς2√
r
 ng∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(Ag)i,j E ς2√
r
(xg,i xg,j |(Ag)i,j = 1)
mg(i)

= E ς2√
r
 ng∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
(Ag)i,j
mg(i)
 ς2√
r
= E ς2√
r
(ng)
ς2√
r
,
and that
E ς2√
r
( ng∑
i=1
xg x¯g,[i]
)
= E ς2√
r
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
k=1
(Ag)i,j E ς2√
r
(xg,j xg,k|Ag)
mg(i)ng

= E ς2√
r
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j E ς2√
r
(
x2g,j |(Ag)j,j = 0
)
mg(i)ng

+ E ς2√
r
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
∑
k 6=j
(Ag)i,j (Ag)j,k E ς2√
r
(xg,j xg,k|(Ag)j,k = 1)
mg(i)ng

=
(
ς2√
r
+ σ2g
)
+ E ς2√
r
 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
mg(i ∩ j)
mg(i)
 ς2√
r
= 2
ς2√
r
+ σ2g ;
here, the last equality exploits the fact that peer groups do not overlap by appealing to (A.2).
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Second, we have
E ς2√
r
( ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i xg,i
(ng − 1)
)
= E ς2√
r
( ng∑
i=1
x2g,i
(ng − 1)
)
− E ς2√
r
( ng∑
i=1
ng∑
k=1
xg,k xg,i
ng (ng − 1)
)
=
ng
(ng − 1)
(
ς2√
r
+ σ2
)
− 1
(ng − 1)
(
ς2√
r
+ σ2
)
− E ς2√
r
 ng∑
i=1
∑
k 6=i
(Ag)i,k E ς2√
r
(xg,k xg,i|(Ag)i,k = 1)
ng (ng − 1)

=
(
ς2√
r
+ σ2
)
− E ς2√
r
( ng∑
i=1
mg(i)
ng (ng − 1)
)
ς2√
r
.
Combining results then shows that the bias equals
r∑
g=1
E ς2√
r
(
ng (ng − 1)2 −
∑ng
i=1mg(i)
ng (ng − 1)
)
ς2√
r
,
as claimed.
Proof of Equation (2.7). By the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem the estimated slope on x¯g,[i]
from a within-group regression of xg,i on x¯g,[i] and xg,i/(ng − 1) can be written as the ratio of the
sum
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i]
(
x˜g,i − δˆ1 x˜g,i
ng − 1
)
, δˆ1 :=
∑r
g=1
1
(ng−1)
∑ng
i=1 xg,i x˜g,i∑r
g=1
1
(ng−1)2
∑ng
i=1 xg,i x˜g,i
,
to
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i]
(
˜¯xg,[i] − δˆ2
x˜g,i
ng − 1
)
, δˆ2 :=
∑r
g=1
1
(ng−1)
∑ng
i=1 x¯g,[i] x˜g,i∑r
g=1
1
(ng−1)2
∑ng
i=1 xg,i x˜g,i
.
Although our main interest lies in the numerator, it is easily established that for the denominator
we have that, under the null,
plimr→∞
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i]
(
˜¯xg,i − δˆ2 x˜g,i
ng − 1
)
is equal to
lim
r→∞
1
r
r∑
g=1
E0
 ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
− 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
mg(i ∩ j)
mg(i)mg(j)
− 1
ng − 1
σ2g .
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Here we have used that
plimp→∞ δˆ2 = −
limp→∞ 1p
∑p
g=1 E0
(
σ2g
ng−1
)
limp→∞ 1p
∑p
g=1 E0
(
σ2g
ng−1
) = −1,
under random assignment. Note that this probability limit is strictly smaller than its counterpart
in the denominator of (1.2).
We now turn to the behavior of the numerator under the null. It is easy to show that
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i]
(
x˜g,i − δˆ1 x˜g,i
ng − 1
)
=
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x˜g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
) (
1− δ
ng − 1
)
+ op(
√
r),
where
δ := plimr→∞ δˆ1 =
limr→∞ 1r
∑r
g=1 σ
2
g
limr→∞ 1r
∑r
g=1 E0
(
σ2g
ng−1
) .
This is Equation (2.7) in the main text. The leading term is equal to our re-centered normal
equation, up to the factor 1 − δ/(ng − 1) in the summand. This result shows that (in large
samples) the multiple-regression strategy of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) implements
our bias correction to the (numerator of) the simple within-group estimator by leveraging on
variation in urn size.
Proof of (2.8). A short calculation shows that, in (2.7), the large-size urns get assigned the
weight
wn := 1− δ
n¯2 − 1 =
(n¯2 − n¯1) (1− pn)
(n¯1 − 1) + (n¯2 − n¯1) (1− pn) ∈ (0, 1)
while the small-size urns get assigned the weight
− pn
1− pn ωn < 0.
Then
vHOr = v(n¯1)
(
pn
1− pn ωn
)2
(1− pn) + v(n¯2)ω2n pn =
pn
1− pn ω
2
n (v(n¯1) pn + v(n¯2) (1− pn))
and, in the same way,
br = pn ωn (b(n¯2)− b(n¯1)).
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Hence, the non-centrality parameter in the limit distribution takes the form
µ∗ =
√
pn(1− pn) b(s2)− b(s1)√
v(n¯1) pn + v(n¯2) (1− pn)
=
b(n¯2)− b(n¯1)√
v(n¯1)
1−pn +
v(n¯2)
pn
,
as stated in the main text. Note that the denominator in the expression after the first equality is
not equal to the standard deviation sHOr . Moreover, because pn ∈ (0, 1),
v(n¯2) pn < v(n¯2) <
v(n¯2)
pn
, v(n¯1) (1− pn) < v(n¯1) < v(n¯1)
1− pn ,
so that
vHOr = v(n¯1) (1− pn) + v(n¯2) pn <
v(n¯1)
1− pn +
v(n¯2)
pn
,
implying that the denominator of µ∗ is always larger than the variance of qHOr . The numerators
of µ and µ∗ cannot be ranked at this level of generality.
Proof of Equation (3.9). The proof mimics the proof of Equation (1.1). The only difference
arises in the second term where, now,
E0
( ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] xg
)
= E0
 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j E0(x2g,j)
mg(i)
 = E0
 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j σ
2
g,j
 ,
from which the result follows.
Proof of Equation (3.10). For urn g write the ng × ng matrix that transforms observations
into deviations from the within-urn mean as
(M g)i,j :=
 1− 1ng if i = j− 1ng if i 6= j .
Then x˜g,i =
∑ng
j=1(M g)i,j xg,j and so
E0(xg,i x˜g,i) = E0(x˜2g,i) = E0
 ng∑
j=1
ng∑
j′=1
(M g)i,j (M g)i,j′ E0(xg,j xg,j′)
 = E0
 ng∑
j=1
(M g)
2
i,j σ
2
g,j
 .
Let xg := (xg,1, . . . , xg,ng)
′, σ2g := (σ2g,1, . . . , σ2g,ng)
′, and let ∗ denote the elementwise product
between two matrices of conformable dimension. Then the above equation can be written in
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vector form as E0(xg ∗ x˜g) = E0((M g ∗M g) σ2g). Consequently, E0((M g ∗M g)−1 (xg ∗ x˜g)) = σ2g
and
ng∑
j=1
((M g ∗M g)−1)i,j xg,j x˜g,j
is an unbiased estimator of σ2g,i provided that the matrix (M g ∗M g) is invertible. A calculation
shows that the inverse is well-defined when ng > 2 and that
((M g ∗M g)−1)i,j =: (Ig)i,j =

ng
ng−2
(
1− 1ng(ng−1)
)
if i = j
− ngng−2 1ng(ng−1) if i 6= j
.
An unbiased plug-in estimator of the bias in (3.9) thus is
−
r∑
g=1
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
1
mg(i)
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j
ng∑
j′=1
(Ig)j,j′ xg,j′ x˜g,j′ = −
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j′=1
ωg,j′ xg,j′ x˜g,j′ ,
on verifying that, indeed,
ωg,j′ =
1
ng
ng∑
i=1
∑ng
j=1(Ag)i,j (Ig)j,j′
mg(i)
.
This then immediately also implies the unbiasedness of qHCr as defined in (3.10). The proof is
complete.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 1. It suffices to redefine
λgi,j :=
 ωg,i if i = j(Ag)i,j/mg(i) if i 6= j ,
and note that these weights are again uniformly bounded.
Proof of Theorem 3. By the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem the estimated slope on x¯g,[i] from
a within-group regression of xg,i on x¯g,[i] and covariate vector wg,i equals∑r
g=1
∑ng
i=1 x¯g,[i] x˙g,i∑r
g=1
∑ng
i=1 x¯g,[i] ˙¯xg,[i]
,
where x˙g,i = x˜g,i − w˜′g,iβˆ1, for
βˆ1 :=
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,iw
′
g,i
−1 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,i xg,i
 ,
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and ˙¯xg,[i] = ˜¯xg,[i] − w˜′g,iβˆ2, with
βˆ2 :=
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,iw
′
g,i
−1 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,i x¯g,[i]
 .
are residuals from auxiliary within-group regressions. We are again only concerned with the
numerator.
Let x¨g,i := x˜g,i − w˜′g,i β1 and ¨¯xg,[i] := ˜¯xg,[i] − w˜′g,i β2 be the deviations of x˜g,i and ˜¯xg,[i] from their
respective population linear projections on urn-specific intercepts and the covariate vector wg,i.
Then
βˆ1 = β1 +
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,iw
′
g,i
−1 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,i x¨g,i
 ,
βˆ2 = β2 +
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,iw
′
g,i
−1 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,i ¨¯xg,[i]
 ,
are the conventional sample-error representations that follow from re-arrangement. Hence, some
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elementary re-arrangement gives
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x˙g,i =
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] (x¨g,i − w˜′g,i(βˆ1 − β1))
=
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x¨g,i

−
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] w˜
′
g,i
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,iw
′
g,i
−1 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜′g,i x¨g,i

=
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¨g,i (˜¯xg,[i] − w˜′g,i βˆ2)
=
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¨g,i (¨¯xg,[i] − w˜′g,i (βˆ2 − β2))
=
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¨g,i ¨¯xg,[i]

−
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¨g,i w˜
′
g,i
 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,iw
′
g,i
−1 r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜′g,i ¨¯xg,[i]

=
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¨g,i ¨¯xg,[i] + op(
√
r).
Here, the last equality is a consequence of
1
r
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
w˜g,iw
′
g,i
p→ lim
r→∞
1
r
r∑
g=1
E
( ng∑
i=1
w˜g,iw
′
g,i
)
,
where the probability limit is a well-defined and invertible matrix, together with the observation
that
1
r
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
(w˜g,i x¨g,i) +Op(r
−1/2),
1
r
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
(
w˜g,i ¨¯xg,[i]
)
+Op(r
−1/2),
where we have used E(w˜g,i x¨g,i) = 0 and E(w˜g,i ¨¯xg,[i]) = 0, which hold by basic properties of linear
projection.
With the representation
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x˙g,i =
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¨g,i x¯g,[i] + op(
√
r) (A.9)
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we turn to calculating the expectation of the sum on the right-hand side, under the null. It is
useful to observe that, in the presence of covariates, the null of (conditional) random assignment
implies that
xˇg,i|wg,1, . . .wg,ng ∼ independent (αg, σ2g), xˇg,i := xg,i −w′g,iβ.
Further, we remark that, under the null, the projection coefficient βˆ1 is a consistent estimator of
β. Indeed, it has the interpretation of an estimator of β that enforces the null. We therefore have
x¨g,i = (xg,i − xg)− (wg,i −wg)′β = (xˇg,i − xˇg).
We may now proceed essentially as in the proof of (1.1) to calculate the bias. We find, again
using our normalization that αg = 0, that
r∑
g=1
E0
( ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x¨g,i
)
=
r∑
g=1
E0
( ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] (xˇg,i − xˇg)
)
=
r∑
g=1
E0
 ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
(Ag)i,j (xˇg,i − xˇg)xg,j
mg(i)

= −
r∑
g=1
E0
 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
k=1
(Ag)i,j xg,j xˇg,k
mg(i)

= −
r∑
g=1
E0
 1
ng
ng∑
i=1
ng∑
j=1
ng∑
k=1
(Ag)i,j xˇg,j xˇg,k
mg(i)

= −
r∑
g=1
σ2g .
The transitions in this display have made use of
E0 (xˇg,i xg,j) = E0 (xˇg,i xˇg,j) + E0
(
xˇg,i w˜
′
g,j
)
β,
where
E0 (xˇg,i xˇg,j)
 σ2g if i = j0 if i 6= j ,
and E0
(
xˇg,i w˜
′
g,j
)
= E0
(
E0
(
xˇg,i|wg,1, . . .wg,ng
)
w˜′g,j
)
= 0.
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The urn-specific variances are estimated by
1
ng − 1
ng∑
i=1
x˙g,i xg,i,
and so the corrected covariance estimator is
r∑
g=1
( ng∑
i=1
x¯g,[i] x˙g,i +
1
ng − 1
ng∑
i=1
x˙g,i xg,i
)
=
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x˙g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
)
,
which is qˆHOr .
From the argument above,
qˆHOr =
r∑
g=1
ng∑
i=1
x¨g,i
(
x¯g,[i] +
xg,i
ng − 1
)
+ op(
√
r).
The remained of the proof then parallels the proof of Theorem 1.
Figure 3: Power in the design of Stevenson (2015)
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Power against endogenous/exogenous effects (left plot) and correlated effects (right plot) in the design of
Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) for our test (dashed line) and for the test of Guryan, Kroft and
Notowidigdo (2009) (dashed-dotted line). A horizontal dashed-dotted line indicates the size of the test.
Plots are based on theoretical calculations and are for 100 urns.
Additional asymptotic-power comparisons. Stevenson (2015) simulated power against
the fixed correlated-effect alternative of σ2η/σ
2 = .03 in a Monte Carlo setup similar to the one
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used by Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009). First 100 urns are randomly allocated a size
ng ∈ {39, 42, 45, 48, 51} and then individuals are randomly allocated to a peer group of size three.
Here we extend this exercise to all alternatives of the form σ2η/σ
2 > 0 and also provide power
against endogenous/exogenous-effect alternatives. Figure 3 contains power curves for our test
(dashed line) and the test of Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009) (dashed-dotted line) based
on our power calculations in the main text. Both tests are two-sided and are performed at the
5% significance level. The results confirm and generalize the low-power findings observed by
Stevenson (2015). In addition, she also reported simulated power for the permutation test and
for her split-sample test to be .502 and .455 when the alternative is σ2η/σ
2 = .03. In this case, the
theoretical power of our test is .521.
References
Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul (2009). Social connections and incentives in the workplace:
Evidence from personnel data. Econometrica 77, 1047–1094.
Bramoulle´, Y., H. Djebbari, and B. Fortin (2009). Identification of peer effects through social
networks. Journal of Econometrics 150, 41–55.
Caeyers, B. and M. Fafchamps (2020). Exclusion bias in the estimation of peer effects. NBER
Working Paper No. 22565.
Carrell, S. E., R. L. Fullerton, and J. E. West (2009). Does your cohort matter? Measuring peer
effects in college achievement. Journal of Labor Economics 27, 439–464.
Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, N. Hilger, E. Saez, D. W. Schanzenbach, and D. Yagan (2011).
How does your kindergarten classroom affect your earnings? Evidence from Project STAR.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 1593–1660.
De Giorgi, G., M. Pellizzari, and S. Redaelli (2010). Identification of social interactions through
partially overlapping peer groups. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, 241–275.
Duflo, E. and E. Saez (2003). The role of information and social interactions in retirement plan
decisions: Evidence from a randomized experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118,
815–842.
Godfrey, L. G. (1981). On the invariance of the Lagrange multiplier test with respect to certain
49
changes in the alternative hypothesis. Econometrica 49, 1443–1455.
Graham, B. S. (2008). Identifying social interactions through conditional variance restrictions.
Econometrica 76, 643–660.
Guryan, J., D. Kroft, and N. J. Notowidigdo (2009). Peer effects in the workplace: Evidence from
random groupings in professional golf tournaments. American Economic Journal: Applied
Economics 44, 289–302.
Hahn, J. and G. Kuersteiner (2002). Asymptotically unbiased inference for a dynamic panel model
with fixed effects when both n and T are large. Econometrica 70, 1639–1657.
Hartley, H. O., J. N. K. Rao, and G. Kiefer (1969). Variance estimation with one unit per stratum.
Journal of the American Statistical Association 64, 841–851.
Katz, L., J. Kling, and J. Liebman (2001). Moving to opportunity in Boston: Early results of a
randomized mobility study. Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 607–654.
Lehmann, E. L. and J. P. Romano (2006). Testing Statistical Hypotheses. Springer.
Lu, F. and M. Anderson (2015). Peer effects in microenvironments: The benefits of homogeneous
classroom groups. Journal of Labor Economics 33, 91–122.
Manski, C. F. (1993). Identification of endogenous social effects: The reflection problem. Review
of Economic Studies 60, 531–542.
Mas, A. and E. Moretti (2009). Peers at work. American Economic Review 99, 112–145.
Rose, C. (2017). Identification of peer effects through social networks using variance restrictions.
Econometrics Journal 20, S47–S60.
Sacerdote, B. (2001). Peer effects with random assignment: Results for Dartmouth roommates.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, 681–704.
Sojourner, A. (2013). Identification of peer effects with missing peer data: Evidence from Project
STAR. Economic Journal 123, 574–605.
Stevenson, M. (2015). Tests of random assignment to peers in the face of mechanical negative
correlation: An evaluation of four techniques. Mimeo.
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2008). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for fixed effects
panel data regression. Econometrica 76, 155–174.
Zimmerman, D. (2003). Peer effects in academic outcomes: Evidence from a natural experiment.
Review of Economics and Statistics 85, 9–23.
50
